Why limited war with the US may suit Iran better than peace

Why limited war with the US may suit Iran better than peace By Amir Azimi, BBC Persian Service Iran’s surprise rocket attack on a US base in Jordan earlier this week ended a fragile pause in direct US‑Iran hostilities and prompted Washington to resume strikes inside Iran. At first glance the strike seems difficult to reconcile with a preference for a ceasefire, but it becomes more understandable if Iranian leaders view a controlled confrontation as a source of greater strategic leverage. One interpretation is that Tehran believes a limited war, despite its risks, serves its interests better than an outright peace. Neither side appears ready for an all‑out conflict. The United States shows little appetite for a broader struggle that could jeopardise regional energy infrastructure, disrupt many countries, push oil prices higher and strain US military resources. Iran, meanwhile, may also wish to avoid a total war given its weakened air defences, vulnerable civilian infrastructure and an economy constrained by sanctions, which make rebuilding losses increasingly difficult and expensive. Tehran may have concluded that the current environment creates space for a strategy based on sustained pressure rather than battlefield victory. A prolonged ceasefire under existing conditions would likely leave Iran in a weaker position: the US naval blockade of Iranian ports would remain, sanctions would stay in place and Iran would continue to be largely excluded from global energy markets. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other oil‑ and gas‑exporting states in the region could gradually resume normal exports while Iran remains economically isolated. A limited conflict could alter this dynamic. Although Iran bears a heavy military and economic cost, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and, through the Houthis, around Bab al‑Mandab continue to affect global shipping, raise security costs and influence energy markets. Even modest uncertainty compels governments, shipowners and importers to heed Tehran’s demands. In effect, Tehran may judge that it still retains leverage. Iran also appears to be trying to reshape the diplomatic conversation. Rather than accepting unrestricted freedom of navigation, it has signalled that shipping should operate under rules agreed with or administered by Iran. If that view is correct, Tehran’s objective may be that any future reopening of the Strait of Hormuz reflects Iranian power rather than a return to the pre‑war status quo. An ongoing, limited struggle would allow Iran to maintain pressure to achieve that goal. From Tehran’s perspective, keeping the situation active but below the threshold of full‑scale warfare may be preferable to accepting a ceasefire that leaves sanctions, the blockade and economic isolation largely unchanged. Domestic calculations may also play a role. Iran faces high inflation, unemployment, economic hardship and public dissatisfaction. During