Instead, Project Brakestop is processing its own long‑range cruise missiles, free of overseas components, and costs less than half that of a Storm Shadow. The programme is moving at break‑neck speed, with the UK aiming to have a new cruise rocket ready for service by the end of the year and promising to supply it to Ukraine.
Ukraine has shown the world how to produce comparatively cheap, mass‑produced weapons that are indispensable for a long, protracted conflict.
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At the start of the war its equipped forces relied on aged Cold War‑era Soviet weaponry. A steady flow of Western arms helped it adapt, but now Ukraine produces about 70 % of its own weapons.
A key factor has been the rapid development of drone technology – from tiny FPV one‑way attack drones for the front line to larger long‑range systems capable of striking deep into Russian territory, farther than Storm Shadows can reach. Kyiv is on track to build 10 million drones by the end of this year, doing so more cheaply than Western equivalents by using mass‑produced Chinese parts. NATO allies’ similar drones can be twice as expensive because they avoid Chinese components.
Nevertheless, Ukraine still lacks certain weapons it cannot easily make domestically, ranging from fighter jets to the most urgent need: interceptors to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles. The most effective solution remains the US‑made Patriot interceptor. Ukraine has nearly exhausted its stock, and Russian ballistic missiles now penetrate Ukrainian air defences with ease.
America’s involvement in Iran has tightened supplies further. Each Patriot missile costs roughly £3 million, and production has been slow. The United States plans to triple output from about 600 missiles per year to 2,000, but that increase will take several years.
President Trump signalled last month that he would be willing to share Patriot technology with Ukraine,
but has since rowed back. Even if he had offered support, it would have taken Ukraine at least a year to begin manufacturing Patriots, and the country would still depend on the same scarce components in high demand worldwide.
Ukraine has launched a programme to develop its own interceptor missiles with European backing, known as Project Freya. Building a high‑speed rocket capable of destroying another projectile travelling at thousands of miles per hour poses immense technical challenges, is costly and time‑consuming.
Ukraine’s military and its defence industry have proved to be quick learners. One domestic firm, Fire Point, is working on its own ballistic missiles that it hopes will be ready to fire next year.
Meanwhile, Russia has already accelerated its ballistic‑missile output to roughly 1,100 per month. Developing bespoke weapons is expensive and cannot be rushed; Ukraine faces shortages of both time and money.
Thus, sharing missile blueprints with Ukraine will be welcomed, but it does not constitute an immediate fix for Kyiv’s most pressing shortcomings, nor will it dramatically alter Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia in new ways.