Israelis demand accountability over 7 October failures three years after attacks

As dawn broke over Israel's Gaza border on Wednesday, residents of Kfar Aza moved silently toward the kibbutz's central armoury. It was there, shortly after 07:00 on 7 October 2023, that Hamas-led attackers killed half the community's 14-member civilian defence squad. They were among 64 killed and 19 abducted from Kfar Aza that day. The trauma of those attacks remains raw here. Yet three years later, questions persist over who should bear responsibility for Israel's security failure. "I demand my state take responsibility," said Inbar Goldstein, whose brother and niece were murdered, and four other relatives kidnapped from Kfar Aza. The 7 October assault was the deadliest Israel had endured since its founding in 1948. Approximately 1,200 people were killed across southern Israel by gunmen who breached the border fence and attacked communities. Another 251 were taken to Gaza as hostages. Three years after Israel's most catastrophic intelligence failure, no independent state inquiry has examined how it was allowed to occur. The man in office at the time of that failure—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—is seeking re-election with the same campaign pledge: to be stronger and tougher than anyone else in protecting Israel from its enemies. "Nobody investigated the roots [of the attack]. It didn't begin or end on October 7th—it's a long process of neglect," Goldstein stated. Beyond Hamas's responsibility for the attack itself, growing questions in Israel concern what caused the country's intelligence failure, what intelligence was shared with security and political leaders beforehand, and what Netanyahu himself knew. For months prior, young female soldiers stationed at Gaza border bases to monitor suspicious activity had warned their superiors about potential attack preparations. Among them was Roni Eshel. She was killed alongside 14 other members of her unit when gunmen overran their base at Nahal Oz, just near Kfar Aza. "There are so many questions," her uncle Elad Levy told me. "Were the Egyptians informing the prime minister? The Emiratis? Were there no other warnings Netanyahu ignored? We need to find out what happened—not just on that day, but the year before, and five years earlier." "The truth should be clear," he continued. "If we don't investigate this, it will happen again and again." Over the past three years, mounting reports have indicated warnings reached Netanyahu—from his own intelligence chief and from neighbouring states—which he denies. Last month, Israel's Haaretz newspaper published extracts from a new book alleging the United Arab Emirates' president called Netanyahu ten days before the attack to warn of Hamas plans for a large-scale operation. Netanyahu's office dismissed the report as "an outright lie" and said he would sue the newspaper. Amir Ohana, a member of Netanyahu's Likud party, said in a social media video last week that suggesting Netanyahu could have known about the attack while Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza had only told a handful of people was "preposterous and absurd." Israel's prime minister, he said, had since reshaped the Middle East and did not yield, "even when voices inside and outside Israel urged him to stop." Netanyahu has blamed his own intelligence chiefs for the failures leading to the 7 October attacks, accusing them of deliberately choosing not to wake him in the preceding hours for fear he would order a massive IDF deployment and escalate the situation. "God forbid we wake the prime minister and he says, 'Wake up the entire IDF immediately, scramble the air force!'" he told Israel's right-wing Channel 14 TV network. "What would have happened if they had woken me? This would not have happened," he said, suggesting his response would have better protected Israel from the attacks. Yaacov Katz, an author and writer of several books on Israel's defence, has written about rising concerns over Hamas activity that emerged in the hours preceding the assault. In his book, *While Israel Slept*, he describes calls between senior military figures and intelligence chiefs in the early morning, the sudden recall of commanders from leave, and the deployment of an elite intelligence unit to the border. He told me their expectation was, at worst, a small, limited incursion by Hamas fighters. "So why would [Netanyahu] order a massive pre-emptive IDF strike if every intelligence chief is telling him this is not what this will be? Waking him would not have made a difference." But he said Netanyahu faced other questions regarding his failure to perceive what was unfolding. "You were the prime minister; you set the policy," Katz said. "You created a doctrine and strategy of containment that trickled down to the lowest soldier manning the watchtower on the Gaza border: contain Hamas, separate the Palestinians, and keep Hamas in power to prevent a Palestinian state." For years, Netanyahu oversaw a policy of containing—not confronting—Hamas in Gaza, during which Israeli governments permitted Qatar to supply hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Gaza. A month after the 7 October attacks, he told a German newspaper that claims he sought to strengthen Hamas were "an outright lie." "On the contrary, we wanted to continue weakening Hamas as much as we could," he told Die Welt. "But the funds were meant to prevent a civilian catastrophe—that is the sole reason." Months after the attack, the IDF's then-chief of staff, Lt Gen Herzi Halevi, publicly apologised for failing to protect civilians, saying he carried that burden on his shoulders and in his heart. He resigned. A wave of military commanders were subsequently fired, and Israel's intelligence chief vacated his position. Netanyahu has so far rejected any personal responsibility for the attacks. Col Richard Hecht was the IDF's global spokesperson on 7 October. He told me the refusal of political leaders—including Netanyahu—to accept responsibility was part of why he resigned six months later. "It's a disgrace," he told me. "When you look at accountability within the IDF, I don't think there's a problem. And that's the pain. That's one of the main causes of toxic relations between the political echelon and the military." At a memorial ceremony in Jerusalem on Monday, the father of one of those killed on 7 October stood to confront the prime minister. "You didn't protect my son; you didn't protect all those who were murdered," he said, before security guards led him away. "Shame! Disgrace!" Three years after the attacks, calls for accountability are intensifying. Campaigners have urged Israel's highest court to compel the government to establish a state commission of inquiry. Yizhar Shai, a former minister and oversight advocate whose youngest son Yaron, a soldier, was killed on 7 October, is part of that campaign. "We are entering these elections virtually blindfolded regarding October 7th," he told me during a Tel Aviv protest last week. "Our prime minister has never given a detailed, thorough testimony under oath where he would be asked all the tough questions and required to explain everything." Netanyahu has consistently refused a state inquiry led by Israel's Supreme Court, arguing previously that the judiciary would be biased against him. Before calling an election, his government proposed an alternative "national commission of inquiry" whose members would be appointed by political parties. But despite passing various other legislation before parliament ended its session in July, Israel's government said it ran out of time to pass a measure implementing its inquiry plans. We approached several members of his Likud bloc for an interview without success. We also requested the bloc respond to their critics and await their reply. Netanyahu's denial of responsibility has become an election issue as he prepares to run for re-election later this month. A video game titled *Sleepy Bibi*, released by his main rival Gadi Eisenkot's team, asks players to help the prime minister evade responsibility by dodging attack warnings and "making it to safety." Netanyahu has styled himself for decades as Israel's "Mr Security," and despite overseeing the worst intelligence failure in Israel's history, is campaigning on the same security platform again. For the past three years, he has focused on waging new wars against Israel's enemies—Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Polls suggest a tight race, and that the 7 October attacks are pivotal for many voters' decisions. Yaacov Katz says the legacy of 7 October is a coin with two sides. "There are the failures and mistakes that led to the Hamas invasion," he told me. "But there is the other side, which is Netanyahu's argument: that [he] has re-engineered the Middle East and made Israel safer